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Inference to the Best Explanation and the 
Screening-Off Challenge 
 




Defendemos en Roche y Sober (2013) que la explicatividad es evidencialmente 
irrelevante, esto es, que Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O), donde H es una hipótesis, O 
una observación y EXPL es la proposición de que si H y O fueran verdaderas, entonces 
H explicaría O. Esta es una “tesis de neutralización” [“screening off” thesis, de ahí el 
nombre “SOT”]. En el presente artículo clarificamos esta tesis, replicamos a las críticas 
presentadas por Lange (2017), consideramos algunas formulaciones alternativas de la “In-
ferencia a la mejor explicación”, defendemos dos versiones más fuertes de la tesis, que 
denominamos “SOT*” y “SOT**”, y consideramos cómo estas inciden en la afirmación 
de que la virtud teórica de la unificación es evidencialmente relevante. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: bayesianismo; relevancia evidencial; explicatividad; inferencia a la mejor explica-
ción; Lange; neutralización; unificación. 
 
ABSTRACT 
We argue in Roche and Sober (2013) that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant 
in that Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O), where H is a hypothesis, O is an observation, and 
EXPL is the proposition that if H and O were true, then H would explain O. This is a 
“screening-off” thesis (hence the name “SOT”). Here we clarify SOT, reply to criticisms 
advanced by Lange (2017), consider alternative formulations of Inference to the Best 
Explanation, defend two strengthened screening-off theses called “SOT*” and “SOT**”, 
and consider how they bear on the claim that unification is evidentially relevant. 
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We argue in Roche and Sober (2013) that explanatoriness is eviden-
tially irrelevant in that Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O), where, here and 
throughout, H is a hypothesis, O is an observation, and EXPL is the 
proposition that if H and O were true, then H would explain O. This is a 
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“screening-off” thesis (hence the name “SOT”) to the effect that O 
screens-off EXPL from H in that given O, EXPL has no impact on the 
probability of H. Suppose, for example, that you examine a large random 
sample of people older than age 50, and that on this basis, you arrive at 
the following population frequency estimate: 
 
(1) Freq(heavy smoking before age 50 | lung cancer after age 50) =  
 
Suppose that from your perspective, Joe is a random member of the 
population (and was not in your sample). Let H be the hypothesis that 
Joe was a heavy smoker before age 50, O be the observation that Joe got 
lung cancer after age 50, and EXPL be the proposition that if H and O 
were true, then H would explain O. From your perspective, Joe is a ran-
dom member of the population, so Pr(H | O) = . Given this, and given 
that EXPL should have no impact on your estimate of the frequency in 
(1), Pr(H | O&EXPL) = . Hence Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O). 
SOT and our defense of it have not been met with universal ap-
proval, to say the least. McCain and Poston (2014) were the first to 
chime in with objections. Climenhaga (2017) was next, and then Lange 
(2017) took his turn. We have responded to McCain and Poston [see 
Roche and Sober (2014)] and to Climenhaga [see Roche and Sober 
(2017b).1 Here we respond to Lange, but that’s not all. There are numer-
ous non-equivalent versions of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) 
in logical space. We will argue that SOT refutes some of them, but not 
others. We then will defend two variants of SOT called “SOT*” and 
“SOT** and argue that they refute many of the remaining versions, spe-
cifically, versions of IBE that say that whether H is the best available po-
tential explanation of O hinges on how H scores in terms of unification. 
 
 
II. RESPONSE TO LANGE 
 
Lange holds that there are many realistic cases where EXPL isn’t 
screened-off from H by O, because Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O).2 He 
gives two examples that he claims are of this sort. We discuss one of 
them in Section 2.1 and address the other in Section 2.2. We argue in 
each case that Lange fails to show, or even to make it plausible, that 
Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O). In Section 2.3, we clarify SOT, and 
provide a more general response to objections like Lange’s. 
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II.1 Lange’s Robbery Example 
Lange’s first alleged example of a realistic case where Pr(H | 
O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O) involves a robbery in which a jewel is stolen 
from a safe. After introducing the example, Lange argues that Pr(H | O) 
is greater than Pr(H) but less than maximal (i.e., less than unity): 
 
… suppose that H is that Jones is the person who stole the jewel from the 
safe, O is that the single strand of hair found inside the safe was blond, 
and the background information tells us that there was exactly one robber 
and one strand of hair found inside the safe, that Jones has blond hair, and 
that such a hair has a serious (though not overwhelming) likelihood to 
have been left by the robber during the robbery (though there are other 
ways in which the hair could have gotten into the safe). The background 
information also tells us that Jones is a serious suspect, unlike many other 
people with blond hair – although Jones is one among several serious sus-
pects with blond hair and there is also a fair likelihood that the robber is 
not listed among our serious suspects. Background also tells us that if the 
hair were Jones’s, then Jones would probably be the robber (since he 
would have left it during the robbery); Jones would have had no occasion 
to access the safe except to rob it. 
Accordingly, since the hair that was found is the same colour as 
Jones’s hair, O lends some support to H – Pr(H | O) > Pr(H) – though 
this support is less than maximal, considering that the hair may not have 
come from the robber and that, even if it did come from the robber, the 
robber need not be Jones since many other people (including some other 
serious suspects) have blond hair [Lange (2017), p. 305]. 
 
Lange then adds EXPL to the mix,3 and argues that Pr(H | O&EXPL) 
> Pr(H | O): 
 
But to O in the evidence let’s now add EXPL: that if Jones were the rob-
ber and the single strand of hair found inside the safe were blond, then 
that Jones is the robber would explain why the strand of hair found in the 
safe is blond. The explanation would be that Jones left the hair in the 
course of the robbery. Without EXPL, the evidence’s power to confirm H 
is rendered less than maximal by (among other things) serious doubt that 
the hair comes from the robber. But that doubt is removed by EXPL (at 
least in the event that Jones is the robber). Of course, the evidence’s pow-
er to confirm H remains somewhat less than maximal because of other 
factors, such as doubt about whether the hair comes from Jones. But 
EXPL removes one consideration that mitigated the degree to which O 
pointed to Jones (namely, the possibility that even if Jones were the rob-
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ber, such a hair would not belong to Jones because it was not left by the 
robber). Consequently, H is better confirmed by O&EXPL than by O 
alone: Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O) [Lange (2017), pp. 305-306]. 
 
Lange’s rationale, then, is two-fold. First, there’s the claim that because 
of various doubts, Pr(H | O) is less than maximal. Second, there’s the 
claim that EXPL eliminates some of the doubts in question, and as a re-
sult increases the probability of H. 
What doubts make Pr(H | O) less than maximal? Lange initially 
mentions these: 
 
(2) The strand of hair found in the safe wasn’t left by the robber. 
 
(3) The strand of hair found in the safe was left by the robber, but 
the robber wasn’t Jones and instead was one of the other seri-
ous suspects with blonde hair. 
 
He later points to this: 
 
(4) Jones is the robber, but the strand of hair found in the safe 
doesn’t belong to him because it wasn’t left by the robber. 
 
Lange claims that EXPL eliminates (4), and because of this, EXPL in-
creases the probability of H. This is strange, since (4) is a possibility in 
which H is true. How is it that by eliminating a possibility in which H is 
true, EXPL increases H’s probability? Instead, why not think that by elim-
inating a possibility in which H is true, EXPL decreases H’s probability? 
What Lange is describing can happen, but we doubt that it is true in 
his robbery example. To illustrate how an observation can raise the 
probability of a hypothesis and also eliminate a possibility in which the 
hypothesis is true, consider this example. A card is randomly drawn from 
a standard well-shuffled deck of cards. Let A, D, and S be understood as 
follows: 
 
A: The card drawn is an Ace. 
 
D: The card drawn is a Diamond. 
 
S: The card drawn is a Spade. 
 
Given that ~(A&D)&~S entails ~(A&D), it follows that ~(A&D)&~S 
eliminates A&D and thus eliminates a possibility in which D is true. Yet 
~(A&D)&~S nonetheless increases D’s probability from 1/4 to 12/38. 
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The thing to notice here is this: although ~(A&D)&~S eliminates a pos-
sibility in which D is true, it also eliminates several possibilities in which 
D is false (for example, A&S). 
Is something similar true in Lange’s robbery case? That is, is it the 
case that, though EXPL eliminates (4), it also eliminates various possibil-
ities in which H is false? There’s no doubt that EXPL eliminates some 
possibilities in which H is false. It eliminates, for example, ~H&~EXPL. 
But this, by itself, is insignificant, since, at the same time, and for the 
same reason, it also eliminates H&~EXPL. 
Consider, instead, these possibilities: 
 
(5) Smith, not Jones, is the robber. The strand of hair found in the 
safe doesn’t belong to Smith, and was instead planted by him as 
a distraction to the police. 
 
(6) Smith, not Jones, is the robber. The strand of hair found in the 
safe was left by the owner of the jewel a few days before the 
robbery while she was taking something other than the jewel 
out of the safe. 
 
Clearly, assuming, with Lange, that the background information on hand 
is realistic, EXPL doesn’t eliminate (5) or (6). 
It might be that Lange can flesh out this example of his so that it is 
clear that Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O). We return to this possibility 
in Section II.3. 
 
II.2. Lange’s Physics Example 
Lange’s second attempt to provide a realistic example in which 
Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O) is taken from physics, where H is the 
hypothesis that the light quantum hypothesis is empirically adequate, and 
O is an equation specifying the black-body spectrum.4 First, he argues 
that if H is true but the light quantum hypothesis is false, then it’s a mere 
coincidence that various phenomena behave as if the light quantum hy-
pothesis is true: 
 
If H holds but light is not quantized, then it is just a coincidence that vari-
ous phenomena behave as if light is quantized: the fundamental natural 
laws of light (which do not include that light is quantized) entail the par-
ticular derivative laws (such as O) that govern various phenomena, and the 
light-quantum hypothesis also entails those laws, but there is no common 
reason why these two facts hold: this combination is ‘nothing more than a 
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curious property of light, without any physical significance’ [Lange (2017), 
p. 309]. 
 
Second, he considers the possibility that H is true because the light quan-
tum hypothesis is true too: 
 
On the other hand, if H holds because light is indeed quantized, then it is 
no coincidence that various phenomena behave as if light is quantized. Ra-
ther, there is a common reason why the fundamental laws of light and the 
light-quantum hypothesis are alike in sharing the property of entailing the 
derivative laws. The common reason is that the light-quantum hypothesis 
is one of those fundamental laws. If H holds, then if there are light-
quanta, H can explain O; the explanation is roughly that since there are 
light-quanta, everything behaves as if there are (i.e., H holds), including 
the black-body spectrum, and O is what the black-body spectrum would 
be if H. However, if H holds, then H cannot explain O if there are no 
light-quanta, since then H is just a fluke [Lange (2017), p. 6]. 
 
Third, he argues that Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O&~EXPL): 
 
… compare Pr(H | O&EXPL) to Pr(H | O&~EXPL). Both O&EXPL 
and O&~EXPL confirm H to some degree. But O&~EXPL confirms H 
only by removing one way in which H could have gone wrong—that is, 
only by confirming one part of H (that the light-quantum hypothesis en-
tails the correct equation for the black-body spectrum) and having no 
bearing on the rest of H (that the light-quantum hypothesis entails the 
correct equations for the photoelectric effect, for the Volta effect, …). In 
contrast, O&EXPL confirms H not just by confirming that the light-
quantum hypothesis gets the black-body spectrum right, but also by con-
firming that the light-quantum hypothesis gets various other phenomena 
right. Therefore, Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O&~EXPL) …. [Lange 
(2017), pp. 309-310)]. 
 
Fourth, and finally, he concludes that Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O).5 
Lange (2017), p. 311, says that inequalities of the following form are cen-
tral to his argument: 
 
(7) Pr(the … phenomenon behaves as if there were light-quanta | O&EXPL) 
>> Pr(the … phenomenon behaves as if there were light-quanta | 
O&~EXPL). 
 
Consider, for example, the following, where O* is the proposition that 
the photoelectric effect behaves as if there were light-quanta: 
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(8) Pr(O* | O&EXPL) >> Pr(O* | O&~EXPL) 
 
It’s not immediately obvious, however, how inequalities like (8) figure in 
his overall argument. The problem is that (8) makes no mention of H, 
whereas the claim that Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O) does. 
It might be that Lange is tacitly assuming Hempel’s (1965) Con-
verse Consequence Condition (here understood in terms of confirmation 
in the sense of increase in probability): 
 
CCC: For any propositions X, Y, Z, and Z*, if (i) Pr(Z | Y&X) > 
Pr(Z | Y) and (ii) Z* entails Z, then Pr(Z* | Y&X) > Pr(Z* | Y). 
 
It follows from (8) that 
 
(9) Pr(O* | O&EXPL) > Pr(O* | O&~EXPL), 
 
and this entails that: 
 
(10) Pr(O* | O&EXPL) > Pr(O* | O). 
 
Given (10), and given, suppose, that H entails O*, it follows by CCC that 
Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O). However, if this is how the argument is 
supposed to work, then the argument fails. As is well known, CCC has 
counterexamples.6 
We now set this problem aside and suppose, for the sake of argu-
ment, that there’s a legitimate way to get from inequalities such as (8) to 
the claim that Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O).7 Why should inequalities 
like (8) be accepted? 
We don’t understand Lange’s answer here, but we have a conjec-
ture based in part on what he says about a slight variant of an example 
described by a former time slice of one of the authors of the paper 
you’re now reading [Sober (2015)]. Suppose that two of the students in a 
seminar you are teaching turn in word-for-word identical essays. You 
consider two hypotheses. CC (short for “Common Cause”) says that 
they searched the Internet together, found a paper suited to the assign-
ment, and agreed to plagiarize it. SC (short for “Separate Causes”) says 
that they worked separately and independently. Sober (2015), pp. 103-
104, formulates the following thesis, and says that it is a “first pass” in 
need of refinement: 
 
(11) Pr(the papers match | CC) >> Pr(the papers match | SC) 
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Lange modifies the example slightly by letting “w” be a certain long se-
quence of words, and replacing (11) with the following: 
 
(12) Pr(Smith’s paper contains w & Jones’s paper contains w | CC) 
>> Pr(Smith’s paper contains w & Jones’s paper contains w | 
SC) 
 
Lange then claims that Sober would agree to (12) because he would also 
agree that: 
 
(13) Pr(Smith’s paper contains w | Jones’s paper contains w & CC) 
>> Pr(Smith’s paper contains w | Jones’s paper contains w & 
SC) 
 
Here is Lange’s explanation of why Sober would endorse (12): 
 
For Smith’s paper to contain w, given that Jones’s paper contains w but 
SC, would be extremely unlikely. ‘According to SC, the matching is a co-
incidence; according to CC, it is anything but’ (Sober 2015: 103) [Lange 
(2017) p. 310]. 
 
The idea here (and elsewhere in Lange’s discussion) seems to be that So-
ber would accept (12) because he would accept: 
 
(14) Given SC, it would be a coincidence if both Smith’s paper and Jones’s 
paper were to contain w, and so given SC and that Jones’s paper con-
tains w, it is highly unlikely that Smith’s paper also contains w, 
whereas given CC, it would not be a coincidence if both Smith’s pa-
per and Jones’s paper were to contain w, and so, given CC and that 
Jones’s paper contains w, it is not highly unlikely that Smith’s paper 
also contains w. 
 
Note the transitions from “would be a coincidence” to “is highly unlike-
ly”, and from “would not be a coincidence” to “is not highly unlikely”.8 
Lange seems to agree with Sober (as he reads him) on all of this, 
and further seems to think that analogous points hold in his physics case. 
This suggests that Lange accepts (8), for example, because he accepts: 
 
(15) Given ~EXPL, it would be a coincidence if both O and O* were true, 
and so given ~EXPL and O, it is highly unlikely that O* is true, 
whereas given EXPL, it would not be a coincidence if both O and 
O* were true, and so, given EXPL and O, it is not highly unlikely 
that O* is true. 
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This, like (14), has transitions from “would be a coincidence” to “is highly 
unlikely”, and from “would not be a coincidence” to “is not highly unlikely”. 
However, Sober (2015) denies that a common cause explanation of a 
“matching” between two events always has a higher likelihood than a sepa-
rate cause explanation of that matching. Sometimes the matching of the 
two events favors a common cause explanation that says that the matching 
is not a coincidence, but sometimes it does not. Everything depends on 
the background assumptions that pertain. In the example of the student 
essays, it’s easy to see how (12) could be false. Suppose that if the students 
work together and plagiarize, they will be loathed to include word se-
quence w, but if they work separately and independently, the chances of 
them including that sentence in their essays is much greater. Notice that 
our point here does not depend on this supposition’s being realistic.9 
If, as it seems, Lange’s view is that (8) should be accepted because 
(15) should be accepted, then his argument is in trouble. For, (15), like 
(14), should be rejected. 
We noted at the end of Section II.1 that it might be that Lange can 
flesh out his robbery example so that it’s clear that Pr(H | O&EXPL) > 
Pr(H | O). The same is true with respect to his physics example. 
 
II.3. SOT’s Scope 
It might seem that SOT universally quantifies over all logically possi-
ble cases: 
 
TOO STRONG: For any logically possible case in which Pr(H | 
O&EXPL) and Pr(H | O) are well-defined, O screens-off EXPL 
from H in that Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O). 
 
Alternatively, it might seem that SOT is much more modest, in that it ex-
istentially quantifies over all logically possible cases: 
 
TOO WEAK: There are logically possible cases in which O 
screens-off EXPL from H in that Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O). 
 
In fact, neither reading is right. TOO STRONG is obviously false. Sup-
pose, for instance, that Pr(H | O) is less than unity, and that the back-
ground information codified in Pr(-) includes the assumption that: 
 
(16) (EXPL&H)  (~EXPL&~H) 
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It follows that Pr(H | O&EXPL) = 1 > Pr(H | O). TOO WEAK, in 
turn, is obviously true but utterly boring. If, for example, Pr(H | O) 
equals unity, and Pr(H | O&EXPL) is well-defined, then, trivially, Pr(H 
| O&EXPL) = 1 = Pr(H | O). 
How, then, should SOT be understood? Inspired by Goldilocks, we 
understand it to be saying this: 
 
JUST RIGHT: There are many realistic cases in which the back-
ground information codified in Pr(-) includes frequency data such 
that O screens-off EXPL from H in that Pr(H | O&EXPL) = 
Pr(H | O). 
 
Our smoking example is a case of this sort, but there are many – very 
many – other examples of the same kind. 
We acknowledge, though, that there are some potentially mislead-
ing passages in Roche and Sober (2013). Here is one: 
 
Our screening-off thesis is related to Van Fraassen’s (1989) thesis that in-
ference to the best explanation (IBE) is probabilistically incoherent, and 
therefore subject to a Dutch book. Van Fraassen thinks that IBE proposes 
a two-step rule for updating: if the evidence O increases H’s probability, 
then H receives a further boost in probability if H would provide a good 
explanation of O. Our argument aims to show that the explanatoriness of H 
cannot provide this additional boost; in addition, it side-steps the question of 
how the apparently prudential considerations introduced by Dutch book ar-
guments are relevant to a non-prudential notion of rational degree of belief 
[Roche and Sober (2013), p. 665, emphasis added] 
 
Our use of the word “cannot” may suggest that we meant TOO 
STRONG as opposed to JUST RIGHT, but that wasn’t our intent. We 
meant cannot (in cases like our smoking case where there’s abundant frequency data 
on hand). We regret not making this completely clear. 
Given that SOT should be understood as JUST RIGHT, it follows 
that even if Lange fleshed out his robbery example or his physics exam-
ple so that it’s clear that Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O), SOT would 
remain unscathed. SOT allows for realistic cases in which Pr(H | 
O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O). It even allows for realistic cases in which the 
background information codified in Pr(-) includes frequency data such 
that Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O).10 
Is SOT, understood as JUST RIGHT, trivial in the way that TOO 
WEAK is trivial? We think not, and now will explain why. 
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III. SOT AND IBE* 
 
IBE can be formulated in different ways. Here is one: 
 
IBE*: If (i) O, (ii) H is a potential explanation of O, and (iii) H is 
better overall in terms of explanatory virtues v1, v2, …, and vn than 
each of the available rival potential explanations of O, then it’s ra-
tional to believe H and disbelieve each of the rivals. 
 
This is a relatively standard formulation, but there are others. We discuss 
other formulations in Section V.  
Where does probability come into play in IBE*? Let BEST be the 
proposition that H is the best overall available rival explanation of O in 
terms of virtues v1, v2, …, and vn . We assume that IBE* entails that there 
are no cases in its scope where O, EXPL, and BEST are true but: 
 
(17) Pr(H | O&EXPL&BEST) ≤ 0.5 
 
For, presumably, if Pr(H | O&EXPL&BEST) ≤ 0.5, then it isn’t rational 
to believe H and disbelieve each of the rivals.11 
We further assume that IBE* entails that at least some cases in its 
scope where O, EXPL, and BEST are true are such that: 
 
(18) Pr(H | O&EXPL&BEST) > t > Pr(H | O) 
 
Here “t” is the threshold for high probability, and should be understood 
so that it is less than 1 and greater than or equal to 0.5.12 If 
EXPL&BEST never increases H’s probability (given O) from low (not 




(19) Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O) 
 
Should IBE* be understood so that every case in its scope where O and 
EXPL are true is a case where (19) holds? SOT is relevant here. The 
claim that H is a potential explanation of O is in effect EXPL. This, at 
any rate, is how IBE-ists typically construe the notion of a potential ex-
planation. Consider, for instance, the following: 
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‘Explains’ in the second premise [i.e., the premise, in our notation, that H 
explains O] cannot, without begging the question, mean ‘actually explains’; 
rather, it is used in the sense of ‘would explain if true’ [Lycan (2002), p. 413]. 
 
A potential explanation of the evidence is anything that would explain the 
evidence if it were true [Williamson (2016), p. 266, emphasis original]. 
 
Lycan doesn’t use the expression “potentially explains”, but that’s the in-
tended contrast with “actually explains”.14 If IBE* should be understood 
so that every case in its scope where O and EXPL are true is a case 
where (19) holds, and if IBE*’s scope includes all realistic cases, then 
SOT entails that IBE* is false.15  
We aren’t insisting, though, that IBE* should be understood in that 
manner. We are simply addressing one potential way of understanding it.  
 
 
IV. SOT* AND IBE* 
 
The present task is to consider the possibility that IBE* does not 
require that every case in its scope where O and EXPL are true is a case 
where (19) holds. The first point to note is that SOT has a cousin: 
 
SOT*: There are many realistic cases in which the background in-
formation codified in Pr(-) includes frequency data such that O 
screens-off BEST from H in that Pr(H | O&BEST) = Pr(H | O). 
 
There’s no explicit mention here of EXPL. But it’s there implicitly, 
since BEST is logically equivalent to EXPL&BEST, which means that 
Pr(H | O&BEST) = Pr(H | O&EXPL&BEST). Is SOT* true, and if 
so, does it undermine IBE*? 
It might seem that SOT* follows from SOT. For, BEST is logically 
stronger than EXPL, and it might seem that for any propositions X, X*, 
Y, and Z, if (i) Pr(Z | Y&X) = Pr(Z | Y) and (ii) X* is logically stronger 
than X, then Pr(Z | Y&X*) = Pr(Z | Y). But, as with CCC, there are ex-
ceptions, for example, where 1 > Pr(Z | Y&X) = Pr(Z | Y), and X* is 
the conjunction of X and Z. 
There are many different explanatory virtues noted in the extant lit-
erature on IBE.16 Some commonly cited examples are: 
 
(a) empirical adequacy 
 
(b) explanatory power 
 
(c) fit with background data 
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(e) internal consistency 
 












Different sets of explanatory virtues lead to different versions of IBE*.17 
We want to focus on versions of IBE* on which unification is included 
in v1, v2, …, and vn. We assume for definiteness that a common cause ex-
planation is always superior in unification to a separate cause explana-
tion. This way of understanding unification has some prima facie appeal, 
and has been explicitly endorsed in the extant literature on unification.18 
Suppose, adapting a case introduced in Lange (2004) and later mod-
ified in Blanchard (2018), that your background information includes the 
following frequency data: 
 
(20) Freq(pleuritis & malar rash | lupus) = 0.891 > 0.0495 = 
Freq(pleuritis & malar rash) 
 
(21) Freq(lupus) = 0.005 
 
(22) Freq(lupus | pleuritis & malar rash) = 0.09 
 
Let L, M, and P be understood as follows: 
 
L: Jones has lupus. 
 
M: Jones has a malar rash. 
 
P: Jones has pleuritis. 
 
Given (20), (21), and (22), and given that, suppose, Jones is a random 
member of the population from your perspective, you should have the 
following probabilities: 
 
(23) Pr(P&M | L) = 0.891 > 0.0495 = Pr(P&M) 
 
(24) Pr(L) = 0.005 
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(25) Pr(L | P&M) = 0.09 
 
You then learn that P&M, and as a result rightly increase your credence 
in L from 0.005 to 0.09. 
Now let B and F be understood as follows: 
 
B: Jones has Bloom’s disease. 
 
F: Jones has the flu. 
 
Suppose that you subsequently come to learn that pleuritis is caused 
both by lupus and by the flu, and that malar rashes are caused both by 
lupus and by Bloom’s disease. You then have two potential explanations 
of P&M. One is L, which is a common cause explanation. The other is 
F&B, which is a separate cause explanation. Which is better in terms of 
v1, v2, …, and vn? 
Given the assumption that a common cause explanation is always 
more unifying than a separate cause explanation, it follows that L is su-
perior in unification to F&B. Suppose that L is equal or superior to F&B 
in terms of each of the remaining explanatory virtues included in v1, v2, 
…, and vn, and that you learn this and thus further learn that L is better 
overall in terms of v1, v2, …, and vn than F&B.19 Should you increase your 
credence in L from 0.09 to some higher value? It seems clear that the an-
swer is negative; your credence in L should remain at 0.09. 
What if you learned not just that L surpasses F&B in terms of v1, v2, 
…, and vn, but also that since there are no additional available potential 
explanations of P&M, L surpasses each of its rival available potential ex-
planations in terms of v1, v2, …, and vn? What if, in other words, you 
learned BEST? The answer, it seems, is the same: BEST is screened-off 
in that your credence in L should remain at 0.09. 
This verdict can be bolstered by adding some further details to the 
example. Suppose that your frequency data goes beyond (20), (21), and 
(22). Suppose in particular that it includes: 
 
(26) Freq(pleuritis & malar rash | flu & Bloom’s disease) = 0.891 
 
(27) Freq(flu & Bloom’s disease) = 0.005 
 
(28) Freq(flu & Bloom’s disease | pleuritis & malar rash) = 0.09 
 
It follows that your frequency data is neutral between L and F&B. For, 
you know that Jones has pleuritis and a malar rash (and know nothing 
else relevant about his symptoms), and you know that the frequency of 
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lupus among people who have pleuritis and a malar rash is equal to the 
frequency of the flu and Bloom’s disease among such people. But then 
you, like your frequency data, should be neutral between L and F&B. 
Things could have turned out differently. Your background infor-
mation could have included things in addition to the frequency data given in 
(20), (21), (22), (26), (27), and (28), and this extra information could have had 
the result that your credence in L should be greater than your credence in 
F&B. You could have known, for instance, that Jones’s partner has lupus, 
and that lupus is easily passed from person to person. We were supposing, 
though, that initially Jones was a random member of the population from 
your perspective, so you didn’t have any such extra information. 
There is nothing special about our lupus example. It’s typical of 
many realistic cases in which the background information codified in 
Pr(-) includes frequency data such that, although BEST is true (because 
H is superior in unification to each of the available rival potential expla-
nations of O), BEST is screened-off from H by O in that Pr(H | 
O&BEST) = Pr(H | O). Hence SOT* is true. 
How does all this bear on IBE* (or, more specifically, on the ver-
sions of IBE* under consideration)? If we are right about our lupus case, 
and if IBE*’s scope includes all realistic cases, then at least some of the 
cases in virtue of which SOT* is true are cases where (17) is true and (18) 
is false because: 
 
(29) t > Pr(H | O&EXPL&BEST) = 0.09 = Pr(H | O) 
 
But then IBE* is false. 
Denying that BEST is screened-off in our lupus case doesn’t save 
IBE*. Even if Pr(H | O&EXPL&BEST) were greater than 0.09, surely it 
wouldn’t be greater than 0.5, and thus surely it wouldn’t be greater than 
t. Hence (17) would still be true. 
We noted above that L is superior in unification to F&B, and then 
simply supposed, without argument, that L is equal or superior to F&B 
in terms of each of the remaining explanatory virtues included in v1, v2, 
…, and vn. This seemed legitimate then, and still seems legitimate now. 
Nothing in the case as specified to this point requires that L be inferior to 
F&B in terms of any of empirical adequacy, explanatory power, fit with 
background data, or any of the other explanatory virtues noted above (or 
any additional ones for that matter). 
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V. SOT** and IBE** 
 
IBE* is a relatively standard formulation of IBE, but there are al-
ternatives. Here is one: 
 
IBE**: If (i) O, (ii) H is a potential explanation of O, (iii) H is better 
overall (in terms of explanatory virtues v1, v2, …, and vn) than each 
of the available rival potential explanations of O, and (iv) H’s over-
all score in terms of v1, v2, …, and vn is high, then it’s rational to be-
lieve H and disbelieve each of the rivals.20 
 
Let HIGH be the proposition that H’s overall score in terms of v1, v2, …, 
and vn is high. If HIGH holds in cases like our lupus case, then: 
 
SOT**: There are many realistic cases in which the background in-
formation codified in Pr(-) includes frequency data such that O 
screens-off BEST&HIGH from H in that Pr(H | O&BEST&HIGH) 
= Pr(H | O). 
 
It might be argued, however, that HIGH is false in cases like our lupus 
case. What then? 
There would still be problems. The idea behind IBE** is that 
though O&EXPL&BEST (IBE*’s antecedent) leads to the fully compara-
tive claim that H’s probability is greater than the probabilities of the other 
potential explanations in question, it doesn’t lead to the partially non-
comparative claim that H’s probability is high. HIGH is supposed to con-
nect the two.21 Our lupus example, though, shows that sometimes 
O&EXPL&BEST does not lead to the fully comparative claim that H’s 
probability is greater than the probabilities of the other potential expla-
nations in question. This undermines the idea behind IBE**. 
Let’s set aside this worry and turn to the question of whether 
there’s a legitimate way to motivate the claim that HIGH is false in our 
lupus example. Recall that given the frequency data on hand, Pr(P&M | 
L) = 0.891, and Pr(L) = 0.005. It might be argued that L’s explanatory 
power with respect to P&M is given by Pr(P&M | L), that L’s fit with 
background data is given by Pr(L), and that neither of these is high 
enough for HIGH to be true. What now? 
It turns out that there are variants of our example in which each of 
the following holds: 
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(30) Freq(pleuritis & malar rash | lupus) = 1 = Freq(pleuritis & malar 
rash | flu & Bloom’s disease) 
 
(31) Freq(lupus) = 0.4 = Freq(flu & Bloom’s disease) 
 
(32) Freq(lupus | pleuritis & malar rash) = Freq(flu & Bloom’s dis-
ease | pleuritis & malar rash) ≈ 0.493 
 
Now Pr(P&M | L) = 1 (up from 0.891) and Pr(L) = 0.4 (up from 0.005), 
so that L’s ability to predict P&M (the observation to be explained), as 
given by Pr(P&M | L), is maximal, and though L’s fit with the back-
ground information on hand, as given by Pr(L), isn’t maximal, it is none-
theless relatively high and much greater than 0.005. If this means that 
HIGH is true, then since your frequency data is still neutral between L 
and F&B, and since there are many additional examples like this variant 
of our lupus example, it follows that IBE** is false and SOT** is true. 
Friends of IBE** could restrict IBE** to realistic cases where the 
background information on hand includes no relevant frequency data. 
Then our lupus examples would pose no threat, but friends of IBE** 
would be obliged to furnish an independent rationale for this restriction. If 
the sole reason for this restriction is that otherwise the theory would be 
open to counterexample, the restriction would be ad hoc. Furthermore, 
friends of IBE** should be worried about more than just frequency-data 
cases. For, arguably, things other than frequency data, for example, back-
ground theories, can enable O to screen-off BEST&HIGH from H.22 
What if friends of IBE** simply excised unification from the set of 
virtues (or else simply denied the assumption that a common cause ex-
planation is always superior in unification to a separate cause explana-
tion)? Would they then be in the clear? Not necessarily. Our argument 
carries over to any version of IBE** on which the set of virtues includes 
a virtue v such that there can be realistic cases where H is superior in v to 
each of its rival available potential explanations, and yet substantial fre-





We have defended three screening-off theses, which we’ll now re-
peat for convenience: 
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• SOT: There are many realistic cases in which the background in-
formation codified in Pr(-) includes frequency data such that O 
screens-off EXPL from H in that Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O). 
 
• SOT*: There are many realistic cases in which the background in-
formation codified in Pr(-) includes frequency data such that O 
screens-off BEST from H in that Pr(H | O&BEST) = Pr(H | O). 
 
• SOT**: There are many realistic cases in which the background 
information codified in Pr(-) includes frequency data such that O 
screens-off BEST&HIGH from H in that Pr(H | 
O&BEST&HIGH) = Pr(H | O). 
 
These theses are all existential, but unlike TOO WEAK, they are far 
from trivial. First, if IBE* is understood so that every case in its scope 
where O and EXPL are true is a case where Pr(H | O&EXPL) > Pr(H | 
O), and if IBE*’s scope includes all realistic cases, then SOT refutes 
IBE*. Second, if IBE* and IBE** are understood so that unification is 
an explanatory virtue such that a common cause explanation is always 
more unifying than a separate cause explanation, and if IBE*’s and 
IBE**’s scopes include all realistic cases, then SOT* refutes IBE*, and 
SOT** refutes IBE**. 
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1 McCain and Poston (2017) have responded in kind to our response to 
their earlier objections. We don’t have the space here to respond back. 
2 All references in this section to Lange are to Lange (2017). 
3 Strictly speaking, Lange uses “E” as opposed to “EXPL”. We have 
changed his notation in the quoted passages below, so that it conforms to our 
notation. 
4 Lange construes the light quantum hypothesis as the hypothesis “that 
light comes in discrete quantities rather than continuous waves” [Lange (2017), 
p. 308]. But since he claims that the light quantum hypothesis entails O, which is 
an equation, we take it that he means for the light quantum hypothesis to be 
something more than just the hypothesis that light comes in discrete quantities ra-
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ther than continuous waves. We shall assume for the sake of argument that the 
light quantum hypothesis when fully specified has the entailments claimed by Lange. 
5 It’s a theorem of the probability calculus that for any propositions X, Y, and 
Z, Pr(Z | Y&X) > Pr(Z | Y) precisely when Pr(Z | Y&X) > Pr(Z | Y&~X). 
6 See Roche (2017) for discussion of whether CCC and related theses can 
be repaired by modifying them in terms of explanation. 
7 We also want to set aside a further problem. In the second displayed pas-
sage in this subsection, Lange seems to assume that flukes are explanatorily im-
potent. However, that assumption is dubious. If Smith and Jones run into each 
other on State Street at noon on Tuesday by coincidence, then their running in-
to each other is a fluke. But their running into each other can nonetheless ex-
plain why they each are smiling then. 
8 It is natural to think that two events that happen at the same time com-
prise a coincidence precisely when they are causally/explanatorily unconnected 
(neither causes/explains the other and there is no common cause/explanation). 
This does not mean that coincidences are inexplicable; that’s what separate 
cause explanations provide [see Sober (2012), p. 362 for discussion]. 
9 In addition, Sober (2015) does not commit to the thesis that if the com-
mon cause explanation has the higher likelihood, then its value is much bigger 
than 0.5 whereas the likelihood of the separate cause explanation is much small-
er than 0.5. 
10 Lange argues not just that there are realistic case where Pr(H | 
O&EXPL) > Pr(H | O), but also that there are cases where Pr(H | O&EXPL) 
= Pr(H | O) because EXPL is a necessary truth. He writes: 
 
The problem with cases where EXPL is a logical necessity is that in such cases, 
although Roche and Sober are correct that Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O), this 
equality is trivial since Pr(EXPL) = 1. The equality then fails to show that H’s ex-
planatoriness counts for nothing in its confirmation [Lange (2017), p. 308]. 
 
We have three comments. First, even if Lange is right that there are cases where 
Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O) because EXPL is a necessary truth, this leaves 
it open, as per SOT, that there are also many realistic cases in which the back-
ground information codified in Pr(-) includes frequency data such that O 
screens-off EXPL from H in that Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O). Second, 
EXPL isn’t a necessary truth in cases like our smoking case. Third, as we ex-
plain in Sections III IV, and V, SOT and its cousins SOT* and SOT** are far 
from trivial, given their implications with respect to various versions of IBE. 
11 Some theorists argue that belief and acceptance are distinct in that a 
subject can accept a given hypothesis without believing it. See, e.g., Elliott and 
Willmes (2013). We leave it open whether they are right; maybe there are cases 
in which Pr(H | O&EXPL&BEST) ≤ 0.5 where it’s rational to accept H 
(though not to believe it). 
12 It might be that t varies from context to context. We take no stand on this. 
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13 Cabrera (2017) has pointed out that some of the explanatory virtues are 
antithetical to high probability. For example, if theory T1 entails theory T2, then 
T1 can’t have a higher posterior probability than T2, no matter what the evidence 
is. That said, T1 may have wider scope than T2. 
14 It might be that, strictly speaking, there can be cases where H is a poten-
tial explanation of O, and yet it’s false that if H and O were true, then H would 
explain O, because something else would explain it [see Lipton (2004), Ch. 4 for 
discussion]. We’re ignoring this possibility here (as is standard). 
15 This objection is distinct from van Fraassen’s (1989) “best of a bad lot” 
objection. See Okasha (2000) for discussion of the latter. 
16 For a recent taxonomy of explanatory virtues, and for references, see Ke-
as (2018). See also Beebe (2009); Douven (2017), sec. 2; Harman (1965); Lipton 
(2004), Chs. 7 and 8; Lycan (2002), sec. 3; McMullin (2008); and Psillos (2002). 
17 There are 2047 sets of one or more of (a)-(k). 18 See, for example, 
Blanchard (2018), Lange (2004), and Patrick (2018). There are ways of understand-
ing unification on which our assumption is false. This is true, for example, of 
Friedman’s (1974) account of unification, since it’s restricted to propositions about 
laws of nature. For discussion of Friedman’s ideas about unification, and, more 
generally, his unificationist theory of explanation, see Roche and Sober (2017a). 
19 We are assuming, as is natural, that for any rival available potential ex-
planations H and H* (of O), if (i) H is superior to H* in at least one of v1, v2, …, 
and vn and (ii) H isn’t inferior to H* in any of v1, v2, …, and vn, then H is better 
overall in terms of v1, v2, …, and vn than H*. 
20 There’s a variant of IBE** where the fourth condition in the antecedent 
is the condition that H’s overall score in terms of v1, v2, …, and vn is significantly 
greater than the overall scores of the other potential explanations in question [see 
Lycan (2002), p. 414 for discussion]. If this condition can be met even though 
HIGH is false, then there can be cases where IBE** and this variant of it come 
apart. Even so, what we say below about the former carries over to the latter. 
21 See Douven (2017), sec. 2, for further discussion and references. 
22 We suspect that the genetics example in Roche and Sober (2017b) can 
be adapted to show this. 
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